Meditations VI.41

If thou regardest anything not in thine own choice as good or evil for thyself, it is inevitable that, on the incidence of such an evil or the miscarriage of such a good, thou shouldst upbraid the Gods,⁵⁰ aye, and hate men as the actual or supposed cause of the one or the other; and in fact many are the wrongdoings we commit by setting a value on such things.⁵¹ But if we discriminate as good and evil only the things in our power, there is no occasion left for accusing the Gods⁵² or taking the stand of an enemy towards men.

• 50.vi. 16 § 3; ix. 1, about the middle. Compare Epictetus’s Discourses i. 27 § 13.
• 51.That is, treating as important things which are ἀδιάφορα, or of no consequence either way.

  Adiaphora, “indifferents”: the Stoic term for things such as health, wealth, and reputation, which are neither good nor bad in themselves.

• 52.See vi. 16 § 3.